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Historically, shipbuilding contractors have been
damaged financially while executing long term fixed
price contracts during periods of rapidly rising
prices. Escalation provisions have oeen incorporated
in U.S. Navy shipbuilding contracts in an attempt to
neutralize this adverse effect of inflation upon
contractors. This thesis is an examination of the
nature of two escalation clauses utilized by the Naval
Sea Systems Command in long term shipbuilding
contracts using a case study approach. The case
discusses general price increases, ^characteristics of
escalation clauses, the measurement of price changes,
and the use of price indices. The importance of
selecting proper indices is stressed by focusing on
actual escalation experienced in the DD-963 SPRUANCE
Class contract. A teaching note is provided to assist
in classroom discussion, and questions are also
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I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, shipbuilding ccntractors have been damag-sd
financially while executing long term fixed price contracts
during periods of rapidly rising prices. Escalation
provisions have been incorporated in U.S. Navy shipbuilding
contracts in an attempt to neutralize this adverse effect of
inflation upon contractors. Within the U.S. Defense
Establishment, no command has been as concerned with solving
the problems associated with long term contracts in
inflationary periods as has the Naval- Sea Systems Ccmmand
(NAVSEA) . NAVSEA is responsible for the Navy's shipbuilding
programs. Contracts are prepared, negotiated, and signed by
NAVSEA personnel and the various companies that compiise the
U.S. Shipbuilding Industry. Each contract differs from all
others because of its duration, its articles of production,
the contractual parties to the contract, the economic
environment within which contractual performance is
accomplished, and the degree of certainty with which
contract costs can be estimated.
A. COST GROWTH
Because of these inherent differences in contracts,
there is a range of contract types available for use
depending mostly upon the degree of certainty that actual
costs will equate to estimated costs. The different
contract types are shown in Table 1. While these contract

types can fairly distribute the amount of risk to be taken
by the Government and a Government contractor, they cannot







FISM FIXED PRICE (FFP )
Government contracts for a Simplifies budgeting,
specific quantity at a Encourages competition,
specific price— usually Total risk borne
awarding the contract en the by the contractor,
basis of the lowest bid.
FIXED PRICE ^^ ESCALATION iHJl.
Additional mcney is awarded Govt shares risk of inflation,
on the basis of changes in Poor choice of index may
a prescribed index. distort effects of inflation.
ZIXED PRICE INCENTIVE iFPI]_
Several types available. Spreads risk.
Contractor is awarded for Nc ceiling on profit.
improving performance or
decreasing costs from that
originally estimated.
II^ED PRICE REDETERMINATION JFPR)_
For quantity production. Reduces risk in long term
Realistic price can be nego- contracts, but has little




DESCRIPTION ADVANTAGE^D ISA D VANTAGE
COST PLUS INCENTIVE FEE ICPIF].
For development contracts Some incentives to reduce
when realistic incentives costs. Limited risk to
can be set to improve mgt contractor.
efficiency. Rewards given
when initial estimates are
bettered. Keys on Target
Costs, skeds, or performance.
COST PLUS AWARD FEE ICP AFJ_
For more definite type Spreads cost and profit risk,
contract than CPIF but where Incentive measurement may be
performance objectives are inaccurate because of
determined and success subjectivity involved,
probable. Awards based on
subjective evaluation of
ccntractcr performance.
COST PLUS FIXED FEE 1CPFF]_
Contracror given fixed fee Low risk to contractor. low
regardless of costs motivation for cost
incurred. Used when efficiency. High uncertainty





Cost growth has been discussed in numerous congressional
committee sessions in recent years. The following testimony
occurred between Senator Milton E. Young, R - North Dakota,
as a member of the Senate Appropriations Committee, and Vice
Admiral R.C. Gooding, USN, Commander Naval Sea Systems
Command.
Senator Young: What kind of contractual
and environmental problems do you have?
Admiral Gooding: The contracts we are
having trouble with today were signed in
general in 1970, 1971, and 1972. In
those years, we had a certain tjpe of
escalation clause and its principal
feature was that we paid escalation
according to the Bureau of Labor
Statistics for steel ships. We stopped
paying escalation at the time of
contract delivery. Now, in late 1973
whan the oil embargo hit, the delivery
time for materials stretched out an
inordinate amount, and tne shipbuilders
were unable to complete the ships on
time. Therefore, they completed them,
or are completing them, in a period when
escalation is not recoverable. They are
paying more for their labor than the
clause allows us to repay them. So they
are in a loss situation.
The above question and answer occurred en 31 March 1976
during U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee hearings en the
Fiscal Year 1977 President's budget. The Navy, in its
Shipbuilding and Conversion Navy (SCN) appropriation
request, listed the need for $6,289,500,000 tc be
apportioned as follows;
New Construction (16 ships) $4,104,500,000
Advance Procurement 477,300,000
Out fitting/Post 'Delivery Work 84,500,000
Escalation/Cost Growth (Pre-rFY 76) 1,623,200,000
Both th€ Escalation portion ($1.0895 B) and the Cost
Growth portion ($.5337 B) would provide funds for ships in
the FY 70 through FY 75 programs. According to the Navy in
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its Senate testimony, the escalation shortfall was caused by
increases in the shipbuilding labor and material rates
resulting from a strong inflationary trend in the U.S.
economy. The cost growth resulted from the effect of the
increased rate of inflation upon the cost of government
furnished material on ships already under construction.
Congress, in appropriating the FY 76 budget a year
earlier, had deferred appropriating $1 B of a requested $2.4
E for cost growth and escalation in the SCN appropriation.
Navy officials were subjected to extensive questioning in
this area during the FY 77 hearings, considering that
Escalaticn/Cost Growth accounted for over 25% of the FY 77
SCN appropriation request.
Cost growth is defined as the amount of actual money
spent over and above the initial contract price. The
problem of containing or controlling cost growth has become
especially difficult in the last 20 years as DOD has shifted
its weapons acquisition policy from a Cost Plus Fixed Fee
approach to an Incentive approach (Cost-based or Fixed
Price-based)
.
3. TOTAL PACKAGE PROCUREMENT
During World War II and the Korean War, Cost Plus Fixed
Fee (CPFF) contracts were extensively utilized due to a need
for large scale technological development in weapons
systems. In the early 1960s, Congress demanded the use of
contracts that placed more risk on the contractor and that
provided more competition for weapons systems contracts.
What evolved was the concept of Total Package Procurement.
12

Althougii there was competition in the Research and
Development phase of a weapons system acquisition program
(the engineering development contract) , there was generally
little if any competition for the production contract
because of the advantages gained bY the winner of the
development contract competition. DOO developed the idea of
concurrency which attempted to preserve the benefits of the
initial Research and Development contract by combining
substantial production quantities with the engineering
development effort. Total Package Procurement was seen to
be the method of implettenting this concurrency idea. The
Total Package Procurement concept envisioned that all
anticipated development, production, and as much support as
was feasible for a system throughout its anticipated life
was to be procured as one total package. This total package
would incorporate into one contract firm price and
performance commitments. Total Package Procujramant did not
live up to expectations. The controls were understandably
rigid. Cverly ambitious performance requirements conrbined
with low initial cost and risk estimates resulted in
engineering changes, schedule slippage, and cost increases.
It was these cost increases — "cost overruns" through
Total Package Procurement -- that came under such close
scrutiny by the press. Congress, and Department of Defense
critics. The implication of the resulting criticism ranged
from management inefficiency tc basic dishonesty. Although
DOD has implemented many changes allowing for greater







II. CASE STUDY J. EFFECTS OF ESCALATION CLAUSES CN
SHIPBUILDING CONTRACTS
Senator Young: What kini of contractual
and environm€nta 1 problems do you have?
Admiral Gooding: The contracts we are
having trouble with today were signed in
general in 1970, 1971, and 1972, In
those years, we had a certain type of
escalation clause and its principal
feature was that we paid escalation
according to the Bureau of Labor
Statistics for steel ships. We stooped
paying escalation at the time' of
contract delivery. Now. in late 1973
when the oil embargo hit, the delivery
time for materials stretched cut an
inordinate amount, and the shipbuilders
were unable to complete the ships qn
time. Therefore, they completed them,
or are completing them, in a period when
escalation is not recoverable. They are
paying more for their labor than the
clause allows us to repay them. So they
are in a loss situation.
Vice Admiral R.C. Gooding, USN, Commander Naval Sea
Systems Command, was presenting the Fiscal Year 1977
Shipbuilding and Conversion Navy (SCN) appropriation request
to the U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee when the above
conversation occurred with Senator Milton R. Young, R -
North Dakota, a member of that committee. Vice Admiral
Gooding mentioned the use of a certain type of escalation
clause used in the early 1970s. This case examines the
elements of two escalation clauses: the clause in use during
the early 1970s, called the Contract Curve Method, as it
appeared in the AOR-7 (USS ROANOKE) contract with National
Steel and Shipbuilding Company, San Diego, CA, and its
successor escalation clause, called the Marshall Methcd, as
it appeared in the Option FFG-7 (USS OLIVER HAZARD ISERY)
contract with Bath Iron Works, Bath, ME. Each clause is
15

reproduced in Appendices A and 3, and representative nuoabers
fcr comparison purposes are found in Tables 5 and 6.
While there are several causes of cost growth in the
current weapons systems acquisition environment, the focus
of this case will be on general price increases as a cause
cf cost growth.
A. GENERAL PRICE INCREASES
inflation has been defined by the noted economist, Paul
A. Samuelson, as "...a time of generally rising prices for
commodities and factors of production." The Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) of the U.S. Department of Labor is the
primary source of indices which are used to measure these
rising prices. The BLS publishes the Wholesale Price Index
and the Consumer Price Index, both discussed below, as well
as other statistics and reports.
The U.S. Department of Commerce, in the process of
compiling the national income accounts, computes the Gross
National Product (GNP) Deflator. The GNP Deflator is used
to express the Gross National Product in "constant" dollars
over the years. The GNP Deflator is considered to b€ the
most representative measure of inflation for the econcray as
a whole, and includes a measure of the government and
construction sectors (not included in the WPI or CPI) as
well as the other items measured by the other two indices.
The impact of inflation cannot be underestimated under
current economic conditions. As of April 1978, consumer
prices had risen to 191.5% of their average 1967 level.
16

Althougn yearly percentage changes in consumer prices
averaged between 3% and 6% from 1968 through 1972, the 1973
oil embargo and the resulting world-wide recession of
1974-75 forced prices up at yearly rates of .12%, llfo, and 9%
in the years 1973-75, Such rapid rates of inflation created
significant problems for long-term business arrangements,
such as multi-year shipbuilding contracts, and resulted in
the reguirement for the Escalation/Cost Growth portion of
the Navy's FY 77 SCN budget request.
B. ESCALATICN CLAUSES IN SHIPBUILDING CONTRACTS
Historically, the Navy has had a particular need for
escalation clauses in shipbuilding contracts. The high rare
of inflation combined with the extensive length of Navy
shipbuilding contracts had stimulated the desire to
adequately deal with the effect that rising prices had had
on contractual arrangements. In dealing with these rising
prices, the Navy started incorporating escalation provisions
in its shipbuilding contracts in 1962, Escalation clauses
are the contractual provision for the occurance of a general
change in price levels, i.e., inflation or deflation. An
escalation payment is the contractual amount paid to
reimburse a contractor for any measured change in the price
of his inputs (labor, material) during the life of a
specific contract. Most shipbuilding contracts are of a
fixed price type with incentives for improvements in
schedule, performance, or cost (FPI) . The escalation clause
allows for adjustments in the contract price, either up or
down, depending upon the amount of inflation or deflation
measured during a certain period.
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a review of both escalation clauses appearing in
Appendices A and B would reveal that both the Contract Curve
Method and the Marshall Method have similar characteristics.
The essence of an escalation provision is an agreement by
both parties to wait a certain length of time, measure a
change in the price of specified commodities and services,
and finally for one party to pay the other party a sum of
money to compensate for the change. Both escalation clauses
contain the following essential Characteristics:
1. Measurement of the change in prices
covered by a contract,
2. Prices to be covered,
3. Timing of the measurement for escalation,
4. Formula for compensation for
measured escalation.
C. MEASUEiSS CF PRICE CHANGES
One of the most important decisions to be made when
establishing escalation procedures in a contract is the
method by which price changes are measured. The method
utilized should reflect a reasonable trade-off between
accuracy, administrative cost, and "moral hazard", i.e., the
risk that the contractor will reduce his efforts to cbtain
the lowest prices because he has an escalation provision.
There are a series of decisions required in defining
escalation procedures that will meet the desired trade-off
mentioned above. The first is deciding between using an
established JE^ice index such as the Wholesale Price Index
4WPI) or to use the a ctua l pri ces paid by the contractor.
The usual method in current practice is the use of an index
18

because it is simpler and because it avoids the "moral
hazard" problem.
Since the index approach is utilized in shipbuildicg, a
second decision is made concerning whether the index change
is multiplied by: (1) an estimate of the £r egress of the
contractor each quarter as written in the contract, or (2)
by the contractor's actual progress. This choice reflects a
major difference between the Contract Curve Method and the
Marshall Method utilized in shipbuilding contracts.
A third decision is whether to use a standard material
index for all ships or whether to develop a uni^iie material
composition index for each ship or ship type. Navy
shipbuilding contracts use a standard material index as
described below. Since not all ships are alike and since
shipbuilding mater ials' have changed substantially since the
material index was composed in 1952, this practice
introduces inaccuracy of possible major proportions into the
escalation payment procedure. The use of a standard index
is a much simpler approach and it probably minimizes
administrative costs.
D. PRICE INDICES
Both clauses allow for measurement of the change in
price level by the index method. The U. S. General
accounting Office has defined price index as a ratio of
prices at one time or place to those at another time or
place selected as the frame of reference (or base) . The
index may te a simple price index (related to a single
item) , or it may be an aggregative price index (related to a
19

group of items). Two indexes in common use, the Consumer
Price Index (CPI) and the Wholesale Price Index (WPI)
, are
aggregative price indexes. They are based on the price
changes of a large group of items which are considered
representative of the price changes in the universe from
which the items were selected. The items are combined with
weights which represent their relative importance in the
universe (If the value of labor, for example, is twice the
value of material in a weapons system, the labor index
weight in the combined index is two-thirds and the material
index weight is one-third)
.
The WPI measures average changes in the prices of
commodities sold in the primary markets of the United
States. It measures prices for commodities as they enter
markets at various levels in the production process. The
overall WPI comprises individual commodity indices that are
combined successively into subindices, i.e., the individual
item is part of a product class, which is a part of a
subgroup, which is a major component of a commodity group.
For example, a commodity group may fie metals and metal
products; a subgroup of this may be non-ferrous metals; a
product class of this subgroup may be mill shapes; and an
item of this product class may be aluminum sheet. Because
of such detail, more specific and relevent indices, such as
the shipbuilding Material Index, can be developed frcm the
WPI.
The CPI measures changes in the price of a particular
"market tasker" of goods and services bought at retail by
city wage earners and clerical workers. The index is
published monthly and contains an index representing the
average price changes for U.S. cities as well as indices for
23 separate areas.
Bota escalation clauses depicted in Appendix A and
20

Appendix 3 rely upon two indices published monthly by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) as measures of price level
changes. Th€ BLS St.eel Vessel Material Index is made up of
three commodity subgroups of the Wholesale Price Index
chosen to be most representative of shipbuilding. The three
subgroups are weighted on the basis of the breakdown that
existed for the typical commercial ship in 1952 as
determined by a Maritime Administration study. The
subgroups, their weightings, and subsequent composite index
are:
SUBGROUP WEIGHTING
10-1 Iron and Steel 45%
11-^4 General Purpose Machinery 40*
11-7 Electrical Machinery 15%
Composite Index 100%
Steel Mill Products comprise 72.4% of the 10-1 subgroup,
or about 33% of the total Index. Therefore, the BLS Material
Index is sensitive to movement in the price cf steel plate.
The BLS Labor Index is composed of inputs from eighteen
private shipyards. The index is based upon the straight-time
average hourly earnings reported by the yards. The
shipyards and their respective representation as of June
1975 are shown in Table 2.
The monthly BLS Labor and Material Indices from 1970
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1 S70 197 1 1972 1973 1974 1975
JAN 130..3 136.8 141.9 152. 5 165.0 180 .4
FEB 130..9 138.0 142.9 152..8 165.7 183 .9
MAR 131. 157.7 142.5 152 .5 166 .0 187 .1
APR 131..4 137.9 142.8 152. 9 166.6 188 .7
MAY 132 .0 137.6 143.3 154..0 167.4 190 .4
JUN 132.. 1 137.1 144.2 153,.9 167.4 192 .0
JOL 133, 4 139.0 147.6 156 .5 172.4 194 .1
AUG 134,.6 138.5 148.8 157. 1 174.6 196 .1
SEP 135,.2 138.7 149.6 162, 1 175.2 198 .2
OCT 135, 4 138.5 150.2 162, 6 176.3 200..3
NOV 135, 8 140.6 150.9 163 .5 177.9 202 .3






liZO iiZJ ii22 1973 1974 1975
JAN 116.0 121.8 125.6 135.4 179.5
fEB 116.4 122.7 126.2 137.8 180.6
MAR 116.8 122.9 126.6 142.9 183.1
APR 117.0 123.0 127.3 147.7 135.6
iaAY 0* 117.9 123.2 128.3 152.0 188.1
JUN 113.3 118.3 123.3 128.9 158.6 190.7
JUL 114.1 119.2 123.5 129.0 166.0 193.1
AUG 114.2 121.0 123.7 129.1 170.5 195.6
SEP 114.7 121.1 123.8 129.4 173.4 198.1
OCT 115.4 121.0 123.9 130.7 175.9 200.6
NOV 115.2 120.9 124.0 132.8 177.7 203.1
DEC 115.6 121.0 124.2 133.5 177.4 2 05.7
*Prio'r to June 1970, a Material Index
using 19 57 as the base year was used.
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3. CCNTEACT CUEVE METHOD (AOR-7)
Since 1962, the Navy has included an escalation clause
in its shipbuilding contracts. Through 1974, all escalation
clauses were similar tc the AOR-7 contract clause (Appendix
A) . Known as the Contract Curve Method or 1962 Method, it
w-as the standard method used within Naval Sea Systems
Command to determine escalation payments in a ship
acquisition contract. In this method. Labor and Material
escalation curves were specified in the contract. These
curves were usually quite similar to the anticipated
progress curves for the contract. Unless adjustments were
required due to Government-responsible delays, these curves
remained fixed throughout the contract life, regardless of
actual contractor progress. In addition to the escalation
curves, a Labor/Material split was specified in the
contract, and this split, applied to the Target Cost,
determined the fixed amount of base year dollars apportioned
by the labor and Material curves on which escalation
payments were made. This method had no provision for
reimbursement of price changes associated with engineering
change orders, modifications, or schedule completion
slippage. Once the contract was signed, the pre-determined
expenditure values of Target Cost (TC), material /labcr mix
(C) and expenditure rates (Ei) remained fixed for the
duration of the contract, and were subject to adjustment
only ia the event of partial termination.
Escalation payments were determined as follows, with
separate calculations made for material and labor:
BLSi - BLSo





TC = target cost of contract
C = labor or material % of target cost
subject to escalation
Ei = percentage of total labor
or material cost apportioned
to period i
BLSi = average value of the appropriate
index for period i
BLSo = value of the appropriate index
for the base month specified at
the time of pricing
F.' MARSHALL METHOD (OPTION FFG-7)
It is apparent from recent bids on our
ships that the inflation and general
economic uncertainty in the
in vestment- intensive shipbuilding
industry are causing shipbuilders to be
wary or fixed price long term contracts
unless they receive reasonable
protection against the financial risks
involved in projects which take so long
to complete and are so impacted by costs
over which the shipbuilder has little
control.
There are actions which can be taken and
are being taker to lessen these
problems. We are negotiating with the
contractors to provide more realistic
contract previsions particularly in
escalation clauses to reduce his
economic risk. This will also help the
government avoid future claims and
should help to achieve better
shipbuilder performance.
The quotation above was made by Vice Admiral J.H.
Doyle, Jr., U.S.N., Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Surface Warfare, at the FY 75 Senate Appropriations
Committee hearings. The inflation rates of the 1973-75
period necessitated a review of escalation provisions.
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since 1975, shipbuilding contracts have contained
escalation clauses similar to the F?G-7 contract clause
(Appendix B) . Called the Marshall Method or 1975 Method, it
was derived by LCDR Clyde Marshall, formally assigned to the
Naval Material Coiamand (MAT-0233) . With this method, no
escalation curves are specified in the contract, and the
escalation is paid based on actual costs incurred. Since
actual costs are used, there is no need for a contractual
Labor/Material split. Payments are determined by first
"de-escalating" all incurred costs to base month values
using the appropriate escalation indices. The difference
between actual costs incurred and the calculated base month
cost is then reimbursed as escalation.
Payments are usually determined monthly as follows,
with separate calculations made for material and labor:
BLSo
Escalation Payment = ACi - ACo ( )
BLSi
where
ACi = actual escalatable cost
incurred in period i
BLSi = value of the appropriate
index for period i
BLSo = value of the appropriate index
for the base month specified at
the time of pricing
Sscalatafcle costs, in the Marshall Method, are defined in
terms of direct material, direct labor, and a fixed
percentage of indirect costs. Escalation payments on
indirect costs are made on the basis of the Labor Index.
Ihe portion of escalatable indirect costs are added to




The following tables are representative of the ACR-7
class contract but. have been adjusted for purposes of
comparison of the two clauses.
TABLE 5
REPRESENTATIVE NUMBERS UTILIZED TO COaFARE A OR-
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Ceiling Price (CP) *
Share Ratio











*Ceiling Price is 125% of Target Cost.
**Point of Total Assumption is the point where all cost
sharing ceases and the contractor absorbs all additional












NOMBERS UTILIZED TO SIMULATE
ESCALATION PAYMENTS UNDER CONTRACT
CURVE METHOD AND MARSHlli METHOD
IM ^lIiLl£M CF DOLLARSl
TARGET
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National Steel Bath Iron Works
Contract Carve Marshall






Expenditure Curve Adjusted No Not Applicable
Escalation Beyond
Delivery Date?
No Yes, Index Ceil
is Del* y Date
Limited ty Ceiling Price No Yes (Base Cost)
Adjustment Based on: BLS BLS
Base Month: April 1972 May 197U
Payment Frequency Quarterly Monthly
Payments Limited by











The intracacies of long term major weapons systems
acquisition necessitates detailed examination of specific
clauses to measure their effect on the overall completion of
the contract. The objective of this case is for the
machination of an escalation clause to be studied and
comprehended in an environment of rapidly changing price
levels.
The essential characteristics of an escalation clause
must be present in 'order for the clause to operate
effectively. They are: the prices to te covered, the
measurement of the change in the prices covered, the timing
of the measurement for escalation, and the formula detailing
compensation for incurred escalation. In addition to these
characteristics, the escalation provisions should not create
an environment wherein a less aggresive cost reduction
attitude exists on the part of the contractcr," or wherein
excessive administrative costs are required to implement the
clause.
By focusing on two escalation clauses utilized in
shipbuilding contracts, it is possible to measure different
techniques used to create a similar goal: the elimination of




The inclusion in this case of redent congressional
testimony has attempted to illustrate the visibility and
importance given to contracting difficulties in dealing
adequately with the effects of inflation
B. QUESTIONS
1. If escalation clauses are needed tc protect the
contractor from price changes, what are some possible causes
cf price change?
There tend to be three causes of price change:
1 . A general change in price levels
inflation or deflation, i.e., an
"economic" change,
2. Relative price changes due tc supply
and/or demand changes,
3. Increases in the contractor's input
prices (prices of labor or contracted
Items from suppliers and subcontractors)
resulting frcm relaxed bargaining with
suppliers by the contractor because of
the escalation provision.
The objective of escalation clauses is to adjust
contracts for general changes in price levels. However, it
is difficult to separate the second item above from the
first item when writing an escalation clause. The price of
labor may have increased when Anheuser-Busch opened a
brewery in the Newport News area. This situation may
increase the cost of labor at Newport News Shipbuilding
Company, thus serving as a disadvantage to the Navy. The
existing low cost of labor in Pascagoula, Mississippi,
however, attracts labor to the Litton Shipyard upon a slight
33

increase in shipyard wages relative to the existing economy,
yet labor costs remain lower than similar costs nationwide.
This situation serves as an advantage to the Navy.
Escalation might respond to any price change and must be
used carefully so as not to dis-incentivize the Contractor
from adjusting to new technology, local supply conditions,
etc. The third cause of escalation is called the "moral
hazard" because the Contractor's reliance on escalation may
preclude xiiai from diligently holding down the prices of his
inputs. If prices are measured on a broad scale rather than
on those of a particular contractor, this potential cause
can be minimized or avoided. This broad scale measurement
can be effected by utilizing a recognized price index upon
which to base escalation.
2. Are there any advantages of the (Marshall Method over the
Contract Curve Method?
The major improvement of the Marshall Method over the
Contract Curve Method is that under the Marshall Method
escalaticn payments are based upon the actual timing of
actual incurred cost and the payments continue until
delivery. The continuation of escalation payments beyond
contract delivery date is contingent upon two stipulations.
First, the sum of the total de-escalated costs and all costs
incurred not subject to escalation may not exceed the
ceiling price. Second, a ceiling is placed on the BLS
indices at some point after the contract delivery date. For
the FFG-?, the ceiling on the BLS indices is the contract
delivery date.
3. It seems that the contractor gets all of his actual
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costs under the Marshall Method. What is the restraint upon
him from irrationally spending an abnormal amount of money?
The Contractor should not be penalized for the
occurance of inflation. The Marshall Method thus relieves
the Contractor of this economic worry. Since the contract
is priced in Base Costs according to a Base Month, the
excess monthly costs over the Base Cost (as de-cermined by
the indices) constitute the escalation payment due to
inflation, and only the Base Costs are added to the previous
total of Base Costs. It is the total of these Base Costs
that is compared to Target Cost in order to determine
Profit. The graph on the next page illustrates the aircunt
of profit due the Contractor as a function of the accuracy
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AMOUNT OF PROFIT EARNED



























CONTRACT COST (In Millions of Dollars)
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4. Which method would you recommend for future use? How is
contractor risk affected by each clause?.
The Marshall Method attempts to reimburse the
Contractor fcr all price changes experienced over the life
of the contract. Calculation of payments is not affected
should either cost growth or schedule overrun occur. This
is consistent with the conceptual purpose of escalation
payments to reduce the Contractor's risk in bearing price
changes over which he has no control, thereby reducing his
need for contingency pricing. Under the Contract Curve
Method, the expenditure curves for labor and material (Ei)
are determined by the Navy based on an analysis of the
historical data of the contract bidders, labor/material mix,
material lead times, and fabrication requirements of the
type of ship. The percentage of Target Cost subject to
escalation (C) for labor and material is exclusive of those
projected overhead costs which are fixed. The expenditure
curves and labor/material mix are only an estimation of what
will be achieved by the shipbuilder. The shipbuilder faces
four elements of risk associated with the Contract Curve
Method. Pirst, the actual expenditures may occur at a later
time than reflected in the predetermined curves, leading to
undercompensation in terms of rising prices. Second, the
predetermined labor/material mix may not be achieved.
Third, escalation is not paid on costs incurred between
target and ceiling, only on the predetermined percentage of
Target Cost. Fourth, the index may not reflect the actual
price level change experienced by a Contractor for a
particular ship*
5. For illustration purposes, compute the amount of
escalatj.cn payment due the contractor under each method for
the months of January, February, March 1973; April, May,
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June 1974; and January, February, March 1975. You will need
to refer to Tables 3 through 6, and Appendices A and B
(figure on a quarterly basis for the Contract Curve Method).
Marshall Method:
JAN 73:
Labor: .1 + (.75 x . 3) = .325
142.8
.325 - .325 < ) = $20672
152-5
123.0
Material: .6 - .6 ( ) = $12420
125.6
FEB 73:
Labor: .1 + (.75 x . 3) = .325
142.8
.325 - .325 ( ) = $21250
152. 8
123.0
Material: .6 - .6 ( ) = $15214
126.2
MAE 73:
Labor: .1 + (.75 x .3) = .325
142.8
.325 - .325 ( ) = $20672
152.5
123.0
Material: .6 - .6 ( ) = $17062
126.6





Labor: .4 + (.75 x .3) = .625
142.8
.625 -.625 ( ) = $89286
166.6
123.0
Material: .7 - .7 ( ) = $117062
147.7
MAY 74:
Lator: .5 + (.75 x .3) = .725
142.8
.725 - .725 ( ) = $106541
157.4
123.0
Material: .6 - .6 ( ) = :g114474
152.0
JUN 74:
Lator: .4 + (.75 x .3) = .625
142.8
.625 -.625 ( ) = $91846
167.4
123.0
Material: .5 - .5 ( ) = $112232
158.6
Qtr Totals: Labor: $237673
Material: $343768
JAN 75:
Labor: .2 + (.75 x .3) = .425
142.8 •
.425 - .425 ( ) = $88570
180.4
123.0





Labor: .2 + (.75 x .2) = .350
142.8
.350 - .350 ( ) = $78222
183.9
123.0
Material: .6 - .6 ( ) = S191362
180.6
MAR 75:
Labor: ,2 + (,75 x .2) = .350
142.8
.350 - .350 ( ) = $82370
187.1
123.0
Material: .6 - .6 ( ) = $196942
183. 1
Qtr Totals: Labor: $249662
Material: $577162
Contract Curve Method:
J AH - MAS 73 (QTR 3) :
457.3




) X .005 X $40000000 = $13720
142.8
378.4
Mat'l: 125.6 + 126.2 + 126.6 = 126.1
3
126. 1 - 123.0
/




APR - JUN 7a (QTR 8) :
501.4




J X .051 X $40000000 = $347208
142.8
458.3
aat»l: 147.7 + 152.0 + 153.6 = 152.8
3
1 52.8 - 123 .0
(
J X .043 X $40000000 = $416756123.0
JAN - MAR 75 (QTR 11) :
551.4
Labor: 180.4 + 183.9 + 187.1 = 183.8
3
163.8 - 142.8
^ J X .040 X $40000000 = $459360
142.8
543.2
Mat'l: 179.5 + 180.6 + 183.1 = 181.1
3
181 1 — 123
( 1 1-j X .006 X $40000000 = $113376
123.0
6. What alternative is there to the inclusion of an
escalation clause in a contract?
The alternative to an escalation clause is contingency
pricing whereby the contractor, in pricing his contract
proposal during contract formulation, "builds" into his




C. DD-963 MATERIAL INDEX
(The following material en the DD - 963 SPRUANCE Class
Material Index is presented as an illustration of the
importance of selecting relevent parameters in measuring
price changes. The material can ba utilized in classroom
discussion or can be assigned for out-of-class assignment as
a part of the basic case) .
If a comparison of the components of the NAVSEA Material
Index were made over a period of time, differences in price
changes between the three components would be revealed. For
Iron and Steel (10-1), prices had risen in 1975 to 2Q3% of
their 1960 level, while General Purpose Machinery (11-^) and
Electrical Machinery (11-7) had risen to 183% and 134^ of
their 1960 respective levels.
subgroups J[960 2.9S6 1.973 J975
10-1 100 101 146 203
11-4 100 100 146 183
11-7 100 94 114 134
If 11-7 had a weighting of 45% vice its actual weighting
of 15^, and if 10-1 had a weighting of 15% vice its actual
weighting of 45%, the Material Index at the end of 1975
would be much lower than its actual level. Thus the
weightings of index elements can affect the behavior cf the
resulting composite index.
If a change in the weightings of elements will affect
the behavior of the composite index, it seems reasonable
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that a change in the elements selected fci the composite
index will also affect the composite index. The need to
choose between using a standard or a unique material
composition index was mentioned earlier under Part C,
Measuring Price Changes. The following discussion
illustrates the difference between using a standard NAVSEA
Material Index and a un ign^ material composition index
that reflects the composition of materials actually utilized
in the ship type construction. LT. D.D. Geisraar, in a
thesis entitled "Composition of Material Price Indices for
Naval Ship Contract Escalation", compared escalation
payments on the DD-963 contract using both the NAVSEA
standard Material Index and a unique material composition
index for the DD-963 class as shown below in Table 8:
TABLE B





























If the above unique index had been grouped only along
the three elements usad by NAVSEA in its standard index,
the weightings would have been as follows:




The DD-963 contract contained an escalation clause that
determined escalation by the Contract Curve Method. 3y
applying the escalation payment procedures in that clause
first to the NAVSSA standard Material Index and then to the
unique DD-963 Computed Material Index, LT . Geismar developed
Table 9 shown on the next page. The difference in the
cumulative escalation payments between the two composite
material indices over the period of July 1970 to April 1975
shows that substantially more was classified as escalation
using the standard index than if rhe unigue DD-96 3 Class
Index (Table 8) had been used. It must be remembered that
it is possible that this escalation, based on the BLS
published index, may not have been an overpayment when
compared to the actual prices experienced by the
contractor, since the indices are basically a benchmark
based on the average of the industry to which the contractor
is compared. The actual prices experienced by the
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The Marshall Method utilizes actual expenditures in
computing escalation payments. The Contract Curve Kethod
computes escalation using scheduled expenditures. In
attempting to draw comparisons between the Marshall Method
and the Contract Curve Method, one must initially assess the
value of using actual expenditures in li€u of scheduled
expenditures. While actual expenditures (actual prices) will
more effectively reduce the risks involved when operating in
a period of rapidly rising prices, there is no incentive for
the contractor to maintain his schedule. Under the Contract
Curve Method, escalation payments follow the schedule of
cost expenditures, and escalation payments stop upon
reaching the scheduled contract delivery date. Should not
this incentive remain for the contractor to complete his
work on time? The incentiive to complete on time should be
present in the contract, of course, but perhaps not as a
part of the escalation clause. The escalation clause, as
provided in the Marshall Method, eliminates inflation as a
contractual risk. It leaves for other contractual
provisions the incentives for cost reduction and schedule
adherence. Cne possible method of incentivizing schedule
adherence is through the use of an Award Fee. Periodic
reviews of the contractor's performance would result in the
award of some percentage (up to 100%) of the period's
available award fee dollars. This could be effected in
addition to an incentive type contract. In other words,
costs would te incentive fee-based, and schedule adherence
would be award fee-based.
The Marshall Method is new being used on all new NAVSEA
shipbuilding contracts. The BLS Material Composition Index,
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using the established three elements and weights, is still
being used as tne material index. Its use is justified by
the lower administrative costs encountered in its
implementation. Reasons for adopting the Marshall Method
are based on its four main advantages over the Contract
Curve Method:
1. It is an equitable sharing of
contract risk. consistent with the
sharing inherent in an FPI contract.
2. It reduces contingency pricing which
is consistent with the central purpose
of basic DOD escalation policy.
3. It more accurately reflects cost
growth due to economic factors as
opposed to lack of production
eiiiciencies .
4. It limits the maximum amount of
escalation to that based on costs not to
exceed ceiling price. Payments do not
stop at scheduled delivery date, however
a ceiling is placed on the index at some
Soint on or after scheduled delivery





AOR-7 CLAUSE <CONTSACT CURVE METHOD)
ARTICLE 8. COMPENSATIOii ADJUSTMENTS iLABOH AND MATERIALl
(a) Regardless of the actual changes in the cost of
labor or materials during the performance of this contract,
adjustments in compensation shall be made as provided in
paragraphs (fc) and (c) of this Article. Said adjustments
are based solely on the changes in the Labor Index
identified in paragraph (b) of this Article and the Material
Index identified in paragraph (c) of this Article. Each
Supplemental Agreement entered into pursuant to this Article
shall set forth the calculations upon which the adjustments
in compensation are made. For the purposes of this Article,
33% or the Target Cost shall be deemed to constitute the
labor cost subject to adjustment and shall be apportioned as
shown in the second column of Table 1 of paragraph (b)
hereof. Similarly, 61% of the Target Cost shall be aeemed
to constitute the material cost subject to adjustment and
shall be apportioned as shown in the second column of Table
2 of paragraph (c) hereof. No part of said Tables 1 and 2
shall be rsvised, unless this contract is partially
terminated and then only as provided in subparagraph (f) (2)
of this Article.
(b) Adjustments in compensation on account of changes
in labor cost shall be made as follows for each quarterly
period shown in the first column of Table 1 for this
paragraph oased on the changes in the Nationwide "Index of
Changes in Straight Time Average Hourly Earning for Selected
Shipyards" (June 1962 = 100) for steel ship construction
herein sometimes called the "Labor Index", furnished to the
Naval SiiipSystems Command (Ed. note: Now called Naval Sea
Systems Coraniand)by the Bureau of Lai3or Statistics of the
United States Department of Labor:
(1) The Lator Index for the base month of A^ril
JJ72 shall he subtracted from the Labor Index for tHequarterly period involved, determiaed in accordance with
paragraph (a) below, and the difference computed as a plus
or minus figure as the case may be.
(2) The aforesaid difference, whether plus or
minus, shall be divided by the Labor Index for the base
month and the resulting quotient carried to four decimal
places.
(3) The aforesaid quotient shall be multiplied by
the percentage of the Target Cost set forth in the third
column of Table 2 below, opposite the quarterly period
involved, and the resulting product carried to six decimal
places.
(4) The aforesaid product shall be multiplied by
I (Target Cost). The resulting amount shall constitute the
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amount of the adjustment in compensation for th= quarterly
period involved.
(5) The amount of the adjustment in compensation
shall be upwards or downwards dspending upon whether the
difference, in the labor indices calculated in subparagraph
(1) above is a plus or minus figure, as the case may be, and

































(c) Adjustments in compensation on account of changes
in material costs- shall be made for each quarterly period
shown in the first column of Table 2 below, based on the
changes in the "Material Index for Naval Ship Systems
Command Steel Vessels Contract"^ herein sometimes called the
"Material Index", furnished to the Naval Ship Systems
Command by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United
States Department of Labor:
(1) The Material Index for the base month of
April li72 shall be subtracted from the Material Index forlEe quarterly period involved, determined in accordance with
paragraph (d) below, and the difference computed as a plus
or minus figure as the case may be.
(2) The aforesaid difference, whether plus or
minus, shall be divided by the Material Index for the base
month and the resulting quotient carried to four decimal
places.
(3) The aforesaid quotient shall be multiplied by
the percentage of the Target Cost set forth in th3 third
column of Table 1 below, oppcsite the quarterly period
involved, and the resulting product carried to six decimal
places.
(4) The aforesaid product shall be multiplied by
$ (Target Cost). The resulting amount shall constitute the
amount of the adjustment in compensation for the quarterly
period involved.
(5) The amount of the adjustment in compensation
shall be uowards or downwards depending upon whether the
difference in the labor indices calculated in subparagraph
(1) above is a plus or minus figure, as the case may be, and
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(d) For the purpose of this Article:
(1) The first quarterly period shall commence on
the first day of the calendar mcntfl following the effective
date of the contract.
(2) The term, "Target Cost", as referred to
herein, shall be the target cost in effect at the effective
date Qt this contract.
(3) For the purposes cf computing tha amount of
adjustment in compensation, the amount of Target Cost set
forth in subparagraphs (b) (4), and (c) (4) shall not be
revised unless this contract is partially terminated and
then only to the extent provided in paragraph (f) (2) of
this Article.
(4) The Labor Index and Material Index for a
quarterly period shall be the arithmetical average carried
to one decimal point of the Labor Index or Material Index,
as the case may be^ for each of the three months comprising
such quarterly period.
(e) Nothing contained in this Article shall be
construed as prohibiting the inclusion of changes in the
cost of labor or material in any adjustment in the target
cost, target profit, target price, ceiling price, or total
final price provided for under any other provision of this
contract.
(f) (1) If this contract is terminated in whole, for
any reason, no compensation shall be made under this Article
for any quarterly period subsequent to the quarterly period
during which the contract is terminated.
{2) In the event that this contract is termirated
in part, and such partial termination terminates the
completion of one or more vessels, then, notwithstanding any
other provision of this Article, uhe target cost set fcrth
in paragraphs (b) and (c) , the percentages of target cost
set forth m paragraph (a) , and each column of Table 1 of
paragraph (b) and table 2 of paragraph (c) shall be adjusted
for the reduction in the number of vessels tc be completed
under this contract.
(g) Deferred payments for escalation shall be paid
promptly, upon submission of invoices, whenever such
.
payment, when added to the total of all payments previously
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made under the contract, would not exceed ninsty-five
percent (95%) of the costs certified by the Contractor on
such invoice to have been incurred by it in the perfcr trance
of the contract. Upon delivery of the last vessel under
this contract, any remaining deferred payments for
escalation shall, upon submission of invoices, be promptly
paid. In the event that the amount shown in any
bupplemental Agreement pursuant to paragraphs (b) and (c)
above is a minus figure, such amount shall be deducted from
the next invoice (s) presented for payment under this
contract until such amount has been offset or recouped in
full.
(h) No adjustment shall be made in the target cost,
target price
,_
or ceiling price on account of upwards or
downwards adjustment in compensation made in accordance with
this Article and hence said adjustments are outside the
incentive price revision formula provided for in Article 3,
"INCENTIVE PRICE REVISION (FIRM TARGET)". Acordingly, even
if tae ceiling price is exceeded, amounts otherwise payable
to the Contractor in accordance with this Article shall
continue to be paid.
(i) Any dispute arising under this Article shall be
determined m accordance with previsions of the "DISPUTES"
clause of the contract.
(j) In the event that the labor or material indices for
the quarterly period involved have not been furnished to the
NAVSEA by the Bureau of Labor Statistics by the end of the
ensuing quarter, compensation adjustments ror the quarterly
?ericd involved shall be made based on upon the average of
he cha nges in the indices for the preceding four quarters
for which indices have been computed and furnished by the
BLS. The average of changes so calculated shall be added to
the applicable index for the immediately preceding quarterly
period and the sum shall constitute the labor or material
index for the quarterly period involved. When an index for
the quarterly period involved is computed and furnished by
BLS, the Contractor shall reflect any required corrections
for the quarterly period involved in the submittal for




OPTION FFG-7 CLAUSE ^MARSHALL METHOD)
( a) Gen eral
The contract price agreed to by the garties reflects
the 4-'it>or and material price levels or the base month
identified in paragraph (d) below. It is anticipated that
the Contractor's actual costs tor labor and material may
change from the labor and material costs projected on the
basis of such price levels and the parties desire to provide
for adjustment to the compensation to reflect such changes.
However, regardless of the actual changes in the costs of
labor and material experienced durina the period of
performance, compensation adjustments shall be computed and
effected solely on the basis of monthly changes in the Labor
and Material Indices identified below, in accordance with
the procedures specified herein.
(b) Monthly Period
Except as hereinafter provided in paragraph (e)
,
adjustments in compensation shall be made tor each mcnthly
period following the effective date of this contract until
delivery of the last vessel to be delivered under the
contract. For the purpose of this Article, a "monthly
feriod" or "monthly period involved" shall begin on the
irst diy of a calendar month and shall end at the end of
the last day of that calendar month; except that "monthly
eriod" shall include the calendar months of the effective
ate of this contract and the delivery date of the last
vessel to be delivered under the contract, respectively.
i
(c) Costs Subject to Compen sat ion Adjustment
(1) For the purpose of this Article, the elements of
cost wnich will comprise the monthly costs of the contract
subject to adjustment are (i) direct material costs. (ii)
direct labor costs, and (iii) 75A of indirect costs; the
remaining 25% of indirect costs are not subject to
adjustment. The costs subject to compensation adjustment
under this Article include the costs of performance of
change orders or other work for which the contract price is
subject to adjustment pursuant to the "Changes" clause or
pursuant to other provisions of the contract. Accordingly,
all such contract price adjustments shall be priced on the
basis of the labor and material price levels of the base
month identified in paragraph (d) below. For the purpose of
this contract, the terms "direct material costs", "direct
labor costs", and "indirect costs" shall have the meanings
and shall be allowable in accordance with Section XV of tae




.Withm 15 days following the end of each monthly
period, the Contractor shall submit to the Government (i) a
certified statement of the costs incurred ty vessel, for
each vessel under the contract during that monthly period("monthly costs") and (ii) a certifiea statement of the
total cumulative costs incurred for all vessels under the
contract from the effective date of the contract to the end
of that monthly period ("total costs"). The statement of
monthly costs shall separately identify tne direct material
costs, the direct labor costs, and the indirect costs
incurred during that monthly period for each vessel.
(3) For the purpose of this Article, monthly costs and
total costs are costs which are "incurred costs" as that
term is defined in paragraph (a) (iii) of Article 4,
"Payments", except that:
(i) incurred costs for material shall also include
the full amounts of all billings received from vendors
during the monthly period involved, whether or not the
Contractor has paid the full amount of such billings.
(ii) incurred costs shall exclude the amounts
determined in accordance with the contract provisions
identified in paragraph (a) (1). (ii) of Article 6, "INCENTIVE
Dcentive Price revision" of this contract (Ed. note: any
items fully forward priced and separately accounted for)
.
(4) The costs identified in the preceding subparagraphs
shall be subject to Government verification upon submission
by the Contractor of the certified statements of such costs.
(d) Labor and Mat erial Indices
(1) Adjustments in compensation of account of changes
in direct material costs shall be based on the changes in
the "Index for Steel Vessel Contracts", (1967 = 100) (herein
sometimes called the "Material Index") furnished to tee
Naval Sea Systems Command by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
of the Department of Labor (BLS) . For the purpose of this
contract, the base month for the Material Index shall be May
1974 (Eq, note: Student should utilize the base month given
in Table 3) .
(2) Adjustments in compensation of account of changes
in direct labor costs and on ccount of 75/o of indirect costs
shall be based on the changes in the "Indexes of Change in
Straight-Time Average Hourly Earnings for Selected Shipyards
for Steel Vessel Construction and All Regions" (June 1962 =
100) (herein sometimes called the "Labor Index") , furnished
to the Naval Sea Systems Command by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics of the Department cf Labor (ELS) . For the
purpose of this contract, the base month for the Labor Index
shall be May 1974 (Ed. note: Student should utilize the
base month given in Table 3) .
(3) In the event that the Labor or Material Index, or
both, for the monthly period involved is unavailable to the
Contractor at the end of that monthly period, compensation
adjustments pursuant to this Article shall te based upon the
average cf monthly changes in the applicable Index for the
previous 3 months for which BLS indices are available. The
average of changes so calculated shall fce added to the
applicable index for the immediately preceding monthly
Seriod and the sum shall constitute the Labor or Material
ndex for the monthly period involved. When the BLS Index
for that monthly period has been made available, the
compensation adjustment for that monthly period shall be
recomputed on the basis of such BLS Index, and any
additional payment to or repayment by the Contractor
required by such r ecomputat ion for that monthly period shall
53

be reflected in any invoice (s) thereafter submitted for
payment under any provision of this contract until such
amount has been paid, offset or recouped in full.
(4) In the event that the Final Labor or Material
Index, or both, for any monthly period differs from the
Labor or Material Index previously raaae available by BLSfor
that monthly period, the compensation adjustment for the
monthly period shall be recomputed on the basis of such
final Index and any additional payment to or repayment by
the Contractor required by such racomputation for that
monthly period shall be reflecred m any invoice (s)
submitted theeafter for payment under any provision of this
contract until such amount has been paid, offset or recouped
in full,
(5) The Contractor shall be responsible for the
calculations involving the Indices provided for in this
paragraph and said calculations shall te subject to
verification by the Government.
Computation
iuuutuxy f t=-'--*-*-'^ ^^ <-ati ui-ui-fciiaaiu uuutJ.ciL;c u«j.j.v«i.y udu^ ul oy
the Material Index for that monthly period, whichever is the
lesser; provided, further, that in the event thereafter such
contract delivery date is extended for reasons of Government
responsibility or excusable delay, the compensation
adjustment for each month of such extention shall be
recomputed on the basis of the Material Index for such
month. The result of each computation for each vessel shall
be expressed in dollars and cents.
(2) The direct labor costs plus 75% of the indirect
costs certified on the statement of monthly costs for each
vessel shall be multiplied by the base month Labor Index,
and the product therof shall be divided by the Labor Index
for that monthly period; provided however, that in respect
of any monthly period commencing after the delivery date
then set forth in Section H for such vessel to be delivered
under the contract, the above product shall be divided by
the Labor Index for the monthly period of the aforesaid
contract delivery date or by the Labor Index for that
monthly period, whichever is the lesser; provided, further,
that in the event thereafter such contract delivery date is
extended for reasons • of Government responsibility or
excusable delay, the compensation adjustment for each month
of such extention shall be recomputed on the basis of the
Labor Index for such month. The result of each computation
for each vessel shall be expressed in dollars and cents.
(3) The amounts of the results of (1) and (2) above,
for each vessel, and the amount of the 25% of indirect costs
for each vessel certified on the monthly statement which are
not subject to adjustment shall be added, and the sum shall
constitute the "Base Cost" for such vessel for that monthly
period.
(4) The Base Cost for each vessel for the monthly
period involved shall be subtracted from the monthly costs
of such vessel and the resulting difference (plus or minus)
shall constitute the amount of the adjustment in
compensation for the monthly period involved tor each
54

vessel, provided, however, that no adjustment in
compensation shall be made in the event that the cumulative
sum of the Base Costs of all vessels for all preceding
months exceeds the Ceiling Price then set forth in the
contract; provided, further, that in the ev^nt the Ceiling
Price thereafter is increased, adjustment in compensation
shall be made for each month that the cumulative sum of the
Base Costs of all months preceding such month does not
exceed such increased Ceiling Price.
{5y The amount of the adjustment in compensation for
each vessel determined as above, (plus or minus), shall be
set forth in a Supplemental Agreement to this contract,
which also shall set forth the computations upon which the
adjustment in compensation is based.
{6t In the event that the amount shown in anySupplemental Agreement pursuant to subparagraph (e) (5) above
is a minus figure, such amount shall be deducted from any
invoice (s) presented for payment under any provision of this
contract until such amount has been ofrset or recouped in
full.
(f) Pa^fflsnt of Compensation Adj ustm ent
Payments of amounts of compensation adjustment under
this Article shall be made monthly, after submission and
verification of the information and calculations required by
paragraphs (c) . (d) , and (e) above, and after execution of
the Supplemental Agreement pursuant to subparagraph (e) (5)
above, and upon submission of proper invoices by the
Contractor, subject to any adjustments pursuant to
subparagraphs (a) (2), (d) (3) and (e) (6), as applicable;
provided, that any such payment shall be deferred " tc the
extent of the amount that such payment, when added to the
total of all payments previously made under the contract
(other than payments made pursuant to paragraphs (b) and (d)
of Article 4, "Payments") would exceed the amount of the
total costs. Payment of such deferred amount shall be made
promptly, upon submission of proper invoices by the
Contractor, whenever such amount, or portion of such auount,
when added to the total of all payments made under the
contract (other than payments made pursuant to paracraphs
(b) and (d) cf Article 4, "Payments") would net exceed the
amount of total costs. Upon delivery of the last vessel
under this contract, any remaining deferred payments for
compensation adjustments shall, upon submission of proper
invoices by the Contractor and verification thereof by the
Contracting Officer, be promptly paid.
(g) iS§£Gctign of R ecords
The Contractor shall maintain and make available for
inspection ty the Contracting Officer or his duly authorized
representatives, in addition to such books, records, and
papers otherwise required under this contract tc _be
maintained and made available to the Government for
examination, such books, records, and papers as may r»e
necessary (i) for the verification of the costs certified by
the Contractor have been incurred, and (ii) for the
evaluation and substantiation of any compensation adjustment
requested under the previsions of tnis Article. Errors m
the statements of costs incurred and/or in the computation
of compensation adjustments shall be corrected promptly, and
such correction shall be reflected m the next invoice
submitted after such correction. ^Failure of the Contractor
to comply with any provision or this paragraph (g) fhail
constitute proper grounds for the withholding of any and ail
payments under any provision of the contract until such time
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as the Contractor fully complies with all provisions of this
paragraph to the satisfaction of the Contracting Officer.)
(ii) Disputes
Any dispute arising under thi^ clause shall be
determined in accordance with provisions of the "Disputes"
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